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Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, in his engag-
ing article “Rationality and the illusion of
choice” (Evans, 2014) argues that erro-
neous answers to questions posed in the
study of reasoning and decision-making
(RDM) ought not be viewed as irrational,
just as errors in other cognitive domains
are not viewed as irrational. He attributes
misuse of the term partly to use of nor-
mative models borrowed from economics
or mathematics but even more to an RDM
assumption of conscious, controlled ratio-
nality. Our intent is to respond to the main
tenets of Evans’s argument and suggest,
instead, that attributing RDM errors to
irrationality is proper.
Evans (2014); Evans (paragraph 12)
writes: “How can we both presuppose
rationality and then infer irrationality
from errors? Researchers in no other fields
of cognitive psychology do this, infer-
ring instead cognitive limitations from
errors.” Thus, perceptual inaccuracy is
described using language of perceptual
illusion; suboptimal memory performance
is forgetting or distortion. In experimen-
tal tasks common to RDM, however, the
term “rational” pertains specifically to
normative prescriptions for optimal per-
formance. Performance that systematically
violates those prescriptions, even when
outcomes are consistently substandard or
even negative, is labeled “irrational.” See,
for example, Ariely (2008).
Further, Evans (2014, paragraph 5) says
“In most of cognitive psychology there is
little or no debate about what constitutes
an error. A signal is present or not and
hence detected or not by the participants’
judgment. . . ” Evans’ language is unmis-
takably from Signal Detection Theory
(SDT) (Tanner and Swets, 1954), and
it is instructive to explore SDT further.
In SDT, errors are not random mistakes
or lapses of attention. They are, instead,
the systematic result of a problem-solving
strategy (based on a formal normative
model) that cannot yield error-free perfor-
mance. Although not optimized as in SDT,
many errors in RDM occur because peo-
ple who are paying attention, motivated,
educated, and not otherwise cognitively
compromised, violate normative prescrip-
tions for behavior in systematic ways (e.g.,
the framing effect or neglect of base rate).
Using standard dictionary definitions, the
word “irrational” fits many error-types
in the RDM domain, but perhaps not
in other cognitive domains. Forgetting,
for example, is not a lack of reasoning,
logic, or sound judgment; but then again,
there are no formal, normative rules for
remembering. Much of the research in
RDM, however, observes behavior when
optimal normative prescriptions are avail-
able but are either ignored or misused by
participants.
To augment his thesis, Evans refers
to his theory of old mind/new mind,
whose theoretical drivers (instrumental
learning, hypothetical thinking, and their
conflicts) are not themselves characterized
as rational or irrational. The implication
seems to be that this theory, and simi-
lar theories (Stanovich, 2011), eliminates
the need for using the term “irrational-
ity.” But there is no necessity that a the-
ory’s drivers resemble predicted perfor-
mance errors, just as a theory of memory
need not have as a theoretical driver a
mechanism that forgets. Additionally, it is
the new mind component of hypothet-
ical thinking, uniquely human in Evan’s
view, to which normative tenets of reason-
ing and logic apply, thereby allaying Evan’s
concern that only human animals are
characterized using the rational/irrational
distinction.
Not all errors in the RDM domain
are properly labeled irrational. Often they
result from cognitive capacity limitations,
such as a limited working memory, atten-
tional focus, and stimulus-response com-
petition. Capacity limitations are likely
responsible for foiling aspects of syllogis-
tic reasoning, as one example, and some-
times lead to using heuristics that may
work at least satisfactorily, as when peo-
ple guess that familiar cities have large
populations (Goldstein and Gigerenzer,
2002). Still, even when optimal strategies
are available and not cognitively burden-
some, people adhere to suboptimal strate-
gies that consistently produce systematic
errors, as observed, for example, in the
framing effect and the gambling fallacy.
Although not quite made explicit,
Evans’s central thesis is that character-
izing suboptimal RDM performance as
“irrational” is specifically pejorative, in a
way that such characterizations in other
cognitive domains are not. With respect
to errors in other cognitive tasks, he
writes (Evans, 2014, paragraph 3): “In no
case is the person’ held responsible and
denounced as irrational.” It is not insult-
ing to label people as forgetful, but it
seems unkind to label them as irrational.
Evans claims that the origin of the pejo-
rative “irrational” label is the widespread
but mistaken belief that the conscious
self is in charge of our actions, and that
a belief in this sort of “free will” (our
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summary phrase for Evan’s description) is
invoked in the RDM domain, especially
decision-making, but not in domains like
memory or perception. Inconveniently
for his claim, we find no evidence that
researchers in RDM make use of or imply
such free will in their theoretical expla-
nations. Moreover, the strategic basis of
thinking that is labeled irrational is typi-
cally understood to be outside of conscious
awareness.
If “irrational” is pejorative, then RDM
researchers ought to find another name
for it, as in the case of people with cog-
nitive deficits now being labeled “cogni-
tively delayed,” but who used to be labeled
“feeble-minded.” Unfortunately for the
pejorative argument, it is unclear that
the label “irrational” is similarly insult-
ing, given its use in the context of
characterizing systematic performance that
may suffice but not optimize, and clearly
does not divide people into categories in
which some are rational and others are
irrational. In the domain of RDM, it is
the strategy, not the person, that is irra-
tional, but to fault the strategy is not to
“denounce” the person.
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